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INTRODUCTION:  This policy synthesis 
estimates the effects of the Zambia Food Reserve 
Agency’s (FRA) activities on maize market prices 
in the country. The FRA, a government parastatal 
strategic food reserve/maize marketing board, 
buys maize at a pan-territorial price that typically 
exceeds wholesale market prices in major maize-
producing areas. It then exports the maize or sells 
it domestically at prices determined by tender, at 
auction, or administratively. In deficit production 
years, the Agency often imports maize and sells it 
to select large-scale millers at below-market 
prices. The FRA is a major player in the Zambian 
maize market and substantial public sector 
resources are devoted to its activities. For example, 
the FRA purchased 30% to 86% of the maize 
marketed by smallholders in six of seven years 
between 2004/05 and 2010/11, and government 
spending on the FRA exceeded 25% of total 
agricultural sector expenditures in several years 
during this period. Despite these large 
expenditures on the FRA, relatively little is known 
about how its activities are affecting maize prices 
in the private sector.  
 
The general perception in Zambia is that the 
FRA’s activities have raised the level of maize 
prices and one of the FRA’s goals is to stabilize 
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market prices (Govereh, Jayne, and Chapoto, 
2008; FRA n.d.). This study provides empirical 
evidence on the impacts of FRA policies. Given 
the importance of maize in domestic production 
and consumption in Zambia and the high level of 
government resources devoted to the FRA, a 
better understanding of the effects of the Agency’s 
activities is needed (Govereh et al. 2009). This 
study contributes to such an enhanced 
understanding, which could, in turn, aid in 
improving the effectiveness of Government of the 
Republic of Zambia (GRZ) expenditures in the 
agricultural sector. 
 
OBJECTIVES:  The objectives of this policy 
synthesis are: (1) to use monthly data from July 
1996 through December 2008 and an econometric 
approach similar to Jayne, Myers, and Nyoro 
(2008) to estimate the impacts of the FRA’s 
pricing decisions and net maize purchases on the 
level and variability of wholesale maize prices in 
Zambia; and (2) to identify the policy implications 
of the empirical findings.  
 
METHODS:  We use a vector autoregression 
(VAR) approach similar to Jayne, Myers, and 
Nyoro (2008) and monthly data from July 1996 
through December 2008 to estimate the effects of 
FRA activities on maize market prices in Zambia. 
A VAR is a system of equations in which all 
variables are treated as endogenous and each 
variable is regressed on past values of itself as 
well as current and past values of the other 
variables in the system. Two groups of 
endogenous variables are used in this study: maize 
market prices and FRA policy variables.  
 
The maize market prices included in the model 
are wholesale maize prices in Lusaka and Choma 
in Zambia and on the South African Futures 
Exchange (SAFEX) as well as retail maize prices 
in Mchinji, Malawi. Lusaka is the national capital 
and largest city in the country, and represents a 
major maize consumption area in the model. 
Choma in Southern Province represents a major 
maize production area. Over the 1993/94 to 
2009/10 agricultural seasons, Southern Province 
accounted for 21% of national smallholder maize 
production and 18% of smallholder maize sales. 
Among Zambia’s nine provinces, only Eastern 
Province had a larger share of smallholder maize 
production (26%) and only Central Province had a 
larger share of smallholder maize sales (25%). 
Maize prices on SAFEX are included in the model 
because South Africa is the major source of 
formal maize imports for Zambia, accounting for 
72% of such imports between 1999 and 2006 
(FAOSTAT 2010). Maize prices in Mchinji, 
Malawi are included in the model because Malawi 
is a major source of informal maize trade with 
Zambia, with much of this maize crossing the 
Eastern Province border near Mchinji (FEWSNET 
2010). Retail prices are used for Mchinji because 
wholesale price data are not available.  
 
The FRA policy variables included in the model 
are (i) the FRA buy price premium (the FRA buy 
price minus the wholesale price in the major 
maize production area, Choma); and (ii) the FRA 
sell price premium (the weighted average FRA 
sell price minus the wholesale price in the major 
maize consumption area, Lusaka). Net FRA maize 
purchases (FRA domestic purchases minus 
domestic sales) were initially included in the 
model as well but the variable was ultimately 
dropped because sensitivity analysis shows that its 
inclusion has no substantive impact on the 
estimated effects of FRA policies on maize market 
prices in Zambia. The FRA buy and sell price 
premiums capture most of the FRA effects. 
 
The VAR model is estimated via ordinary least 
squares. The estimation results are then used to 
simulate the maize market prices that would have 
prevailed in Zambia in the absence of the FRA. 
We refer to these as the no FRA market prices. For 
more details on the methods used in this policy 
synthesis, please refer to the forthcoming FSRP 




DATA: This study uses monthly data from July 
1996 through December 2008. The FRA first 
became active in the Zambian maize market in 
July 1996 and the most recently available data on 
FRA maize sales are for December 2008. (The 
FRA has not released sales data for January 2009 
to present.) Data on FRA purchase and sales 
quantities and prices are from the FRA. Lusaka 
and Choma maize market prices are into-mill 
wholesale prices from the Agriculture Market  3
Information Center (AMIC) of the Zambia 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (now 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock). Other 
monthly data series used in the model are: (i) 
wholesale maize spot prices near Johannesburg, 
South Africa, from SAFEX; (ii) retail maize 
prices in Mchinji, Malawi from the Malawi 
Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security; (iii) 
South African Rand-US dollar exchange rates 
from SAFEX; (iv) Malawian Kwacha-US dollar 
exchange rates from the Reserve Bank of Malawi; 
(v) Zambian Kwacha-US dollar exchange rates 
from the Bank of Zambia; and (vi) import tariff 
rates from the Zambia Revenue Authority.  
 
FINDINGS:  This study highlights four key 
findings. First, as shown in Figure 1, the FRA’s 
presence in the domestic maize market increased 
considerably over the last decade. The FRA is 
currently the dominant buyer of smallholder 
maize in Zambia. For example, during the 
2010/11 marketing year, the FRA purchased 83% 
of smallholders’ marketed maize.  
 
Second, as shown in Table 1, since 2002/03, the 
FRA buy price has consistently exceeded average 
wholesale prices, particularly in major maize-
producing areas such as Choma, Kabwe, Chipata, 
and Kasama. The above-market buy price makes 
it difficult for the FRA to export maize unless 
treasury funds are available to subsidize exports. 
For example, FRA exports in 2007/08 and 
2010/11 generated a trading loss (Govereh, Jayne, 
and Chapoto 2008; Nkonde et al. 2011).    
 
 
Figure 1. FRA Smallholder Maize Market Share (FRA Purchases as Share of Expected and Actual 
Smallholder Maize Sales), 1996/97-2010/11 Marketing Years 
 
Sources: FRA; CSO/MACO Crop Forecast Surveys; CSO/MACO Post-Harvest Surveys; CSO/MACO/FSRP Supplemental 
Surveys. 
Notes: Crop Forecast Survey estimates of smallholder maize sales are based on farmers’ expected sales prior to harvest. Post-
Harvest and Supplemental Survey estimates are based on recall data of smallholders’ actual maize sales during the previous 
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Table 1.  FRA Buy Price and Average Market Wholesale Prices (ZMK/50-Kg), 1996/97- 
2009/10 Marketing Years  
Marketing 
year 
FRA buy  
price 
 Wholesale  price 
 Lusaka  Ndola  Choma  Kabwe  Chipata  Kasama 
1996/1997 11,800    6,815  7,672  4,601 5,944  5,504 6,718 
1997/1998 7,880
   10,718  11,262  8,506 11,339  11,634  10,782 
1998/1999 N/A    16,014  18,902 14,617  14,974  16,028  17,161 
1999/2000 N/A    14,768  16,175 12,583  12,166  11,392  11,116 
2000/2001 N/A    15,973  17,304 14,518  13,001  11,922  13,786 
2001/2002 N/A    31,900  26,667 30,344  32,520  24,933  27,975 
2002/2003 40,000
a   48,290  36,575  40,017  39,193  32,903  34,276 
2003/2004 30,000    31,525  27,757 23,096  26,455  20,543  28,716 
2004/2005 36,000    30,480  26,642 25,859  25,400  25,121  26,863 
2005/2006 36,000    39,113  40,749 39,363  36,801  36,544  37,339 
2006/2007 38,000    29,877  31,062 23,839  26,746  22,737  30,167 
2007/2008 38,000    34,962  37,655 30,673  31,699  26,576  37,474 
2008/2009 55,000
b   58,877  57,266  51,554  49,175  45,681  48,958 
2009/2010 65,000    60,879  58,722 55,518  48,160  48,801  54,599 
Sources: FRA; AMIC. 
Notes: Prices are in ZMK/50-kg. 
aInitial FRA price of K30,000 was raised to K40,000 in August 2002.  
bInitial FRA price of K45,000 was increased to K55,000 in September 2008. N/A = not applicable.  
The FRA did not buy maize in Zambia in 1998/99-2001/02 hence there was no FRA buy price in those years. 
 
Third, estimation results suggest that between July 
2003 and December 2008 the FRA’s activities 
raised mean maize market prices by 19% in 
Choma and 17% in Lusaka. Figures 2 and 3 show 
historical and simulated no FRA maize prices in 
Choma and Lusaka, respectively. The two sets of 
results are summarized in Table 2. With the 
exception of 1996/97 (the FRA’s first marketing 
year in operation), there is little difference 
between the levels of historical and simulated 
prices prior to mid-2003. From October 1996 
through June 2003, mean historical prices exceed 
mean no FRA prices by less than 1% in both 
Choma and Lusaka (Table 2). The FRA began 
buying maize directly from smallholders 
throughout Zambia at a pan-territorial price in 
July 2003. Since then with the exception of the 
2005/06 marketing year, maize market prices in 
Zambia have been substantially higher than they 
would have been in the absence of the FRA 
(Figures 2 and 3).
1  
 
Fourth, FRA activities stabilized maize market 
prices throughout the study period. Although FRA 
activities had little effect on mean maize market 
                                                 
1 The 2005 smallholder maize harvest was by far the 
smallest of the 2003 to 2008 period, and FRA maize 
purchases in 2005/06 were relatively small. 
prices prior to July 2003, these activities reduced 
the standard deviations (SD) of Choma and 
Lusaka wholesale prices by 13%, resulting in 14% 
reductions in the coefficients of variation (CV).
2 
The market price stabilizing effects of the FRA’s 
involvement in domestic maize marketing are 
even greater in the July 2003 through December 
2008 period; the Agency’s activities are estimated 
to have reduced the CV of maize market prices in 
Choma and Lusaka by 34% and 36%, respectively.  
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS:  The results in this policy 
synthesis suggest that two of the major outcomes 
of the FRA’s activities since mid-2003 have been 
an increase in the average level of and a reduction 
in the variability of maize market prices in 
Zambia. Who are the likely winners and losers? In 
general, higher average maize market prices are 
beneficial for net sellers and detrimental for net 
buyers of maize (Weber et al. 1988). In Kenya, for 
example, Mghenyi, Myers, and Jayne (2011) find 
that a discrete 25% maize price increase is 
associated with significant welfare losses in areas 
where most households are net buyers. In Zambia, 
nationally-representative  household survey data 
                                                 
2 CV = SD / |mean|  5
Figure 2.  Historical and Simulated (no FRA) Choma Wholesale Maize Prices 
 
 




collected by the government Central Statistical 
Office and Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives indicate that only approximately 
28% of  smallholder farm households sell more 
maize than they buy; the remaining 72% either 
buy more maize than they sell (49%) or neither 
buy nor sell maize (23%) (2008 CSO/MACO/ 
FSRP Supplemental Survey). Thus higher maize 
prices hurt urban consumers and the nearly 50% 
of smallholders that are net buyers of maize.   
Large-scale farmers and the 28% of smallholders 
that are net-maize sellers benefit from higher 
average maize prices. (The 23% of smallholders 
that neither buy nor sell maize are not directly 
affected by higher maize market prices.) 
 
Among smallholder net-maize sellers, gains from 
higher maize market prices would be highly 
concentrated in the hands of the 3% to 5% of 
maize-growing smallholders that account for 50% 






















































































































Table 2.  Summary of FRA Effects on Choma and Lusaka Wholesale Maize Prices 
  Choma price (ZMK/kg)    Lusaka price (ZMK/kg) 
Period, 
statistic Historical  Simulated 
% 
difference   Historical Simulated 
% 
difference 
(i) Full sample period (October 1996-December 2008): 
Mean  486 439 10.5%    559 512 9.2% 
SD  271 298 -9.1%    296 326 -9.0% 
CV  0.559 0.679 -17.7%    0.530 0.636 -16.7% 
(ii) October 1996-June 2003: 
Mean  377 374 0.8%    435 433 0.4% 
SD  272 312 -12.9%    309 356 -13.1% 
CV  0.721 0.835 -13.6%    0.710 0.821 -13.5% 
(iii) July 2003-December 2008: 
Mean  618 519 19.1%    711 609 16.8% 
SD  204 261 -21.7%    192 256 -24.8% 
CV  0.331 0.503 -34.2%    0.270 0.420 -35.6% 
Notes: SD=standard deviation. CV=coefficient of variation. 
 
 
2011). This group tends to have more land and 
non-land assets than other smallholders do. 
Therefore, to the extent that they raise average 
maize market prices in Zambia, the FRA’s 
policies are regressive: higher maize prices harm 
urban consumers and a large proportion of rural 
households, and help large-scale farmers and a 
small number of relatively better off smallholders.  
 
There may be additional welfare impacts 
associated with the market price stabilizing effects 
of FRA policies. However, the welfare effects of 
FRA-induced increases in the average level of 
maize market prices are likely to dwarf any 
welfare effects that result from price stabilization 
(Newbery and Stiglitz 1981). Furthermore, just as 
in the case of higher mean maize prices, relatively 
better off producers are likely to be the principal 
beneficiaries of more stable maize prices (Naylor 
and Falcon 2010). For example, simulations in 
Myers (2006) suggest that a large reduction in 
food price variability (i.e., from a CV of 0.3 to 0) 
results in a welfare increase equivalent to nearly 
9% of income among affluent producers. The 
same degree of price stabilization results in the 
equivalent of income increases of only 2.7% and 
1.4% among poor producers and poor consumers, 
respectively. 
 
Similarly, empirical evidence from rural Ethiopia 
indicates that the benefits from food price 
stabilization are concentrated in the hands of the 
wealthiest 40% of households (Bellemare, Barrett, 
and Just 2011). Moreover, Bellemare, Barrett, and 
Just find that many poor rural households are 
actually hurt by more stable food prices.  
 
If similar results hold in Zambia, it would indicate 
that both the mean maize price raising and the 
price stabilizing effects of FRA policies are 
regressive: they disproportionately benefit 
relatively better off households and have negative 
net effects on relatively poor households.  
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